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I. INTRODUCTION
In civil actions in the Illinois circuit courts, trial judges strive to
facilitate the "convenient administration of justice."' Often, justice is
administered conveniently through civil claim resolutions by trial or
settlement. To prepare for such resolutions, trial judges often schedule
case management conferences. To facilitate resolution through trial,
judges often schedule trial preparation conferences. To facilitate
resolution through settlement, judges often schedule settlement
conferences. Settlement conferences usually involve at least some
informal, off-the-record meetings at which opposing attorneys, and in
some cases the parties themselves and perhaps certain interested
nonparties, confer in the presence of trial judges.
* J.D., The University of Chicago; B.A., Colby College.
** B.A. Eastern Illinois University.
1. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-104 (2002).
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Written civil procedure laws on pretrial conferences historically have
spoken chiefly to trial preparation. 2 This focus was reflected in early
pretrial conference rules governing both federal and state trial courts in
Illinois. The rules spoke to meetings between counsel, in the presence
of judges, that were aimed largely at the simplification of issues for
trial.3 Though settlements often followed from such meetings, they
were generally considered the by-products, not the objectives. 4  More
recently, written civil procedure laws explicitly have acknowledged
case management and settlement as possible pretrial conference
objectives.5  New federal and state laws now even mandate case
management (or scheduling) conferences in many settings. However, as
to settlement, the new laws generally provide little guidance, resulting
in excessive judicial discretion. Furthermore, the new settlement laws
are silent on what happens once settlements are reached.
For the Illinois circuit courts, written guidelines on settlement
conferences now appear in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218.6 While the
companion guidelines on conferences geared to managing a civil action
or preparing for a trial may be effective, Rule 218 inadequately
addresses conferences geared to facilitating a settlement. For example,
the rule fails to set forth standards for settlement conference conduct by
judges, lawyers, and parties. As well, it is silent on the judicial
authority to compel the attendance at settlement conferences of either
represented parties (who may or may not have delegated to their
attorneys settlement authority) or interested nonparties, such as insurers
or lienholders (who often control or strongly influence settlement
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Daniel J. Sennott, Recognizing Party and Nonparty Interests
in Written Civil Procedure Laws, 20 REV. LITIG. 481, 482 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Inqui; y: Transforming the Meaning
of Article 111, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 935-36 (2000) (finding that the original version of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 ("FRCP 16"), promulgated in 1938, was intended to cover meetings
about upcoming trials); see also Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the
Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 349 n. 11
(2002) (noting that the 1938 version of FRCP 16 was adopted by a significant number of states
and still operates in some of those states today).
4. See, e.g., Alfred P. Murrah, Pre-trial Procedure: A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D.
417, 424 (1953) (noting that the U.S. Judicial Conference in 1944 approved the Pre-Trial
Committee's statement that "settlement is a by-product of good pre-trial procedure rather than a
primary objective to be pursued by the judge").
5. See, e.g., 97 F.R.D. 165, 201-05 (1983) (making "facilitating the settlement of the case" an
express legitimate objective of a pretrial conference in a 1983 amendment to FRCP 16); ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 218(a)(6) (listing "the possibility of settlement" as appropriate for consideration at a
pretrial conference).
6. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218; see also infra note 37 (providing the text of Rule 218 in full).
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decisions). 7 Rule 218 is also silent on whether and when the same
judge who will preside at trial may preside over a related settlement
conference, 8 as well as whether an attorney appearing on behalf of a
client at a settlement conference is presumed to have settlement
authority. Finally, the rule says little about alleged breaches of
settlement agreements.
If settlement facilitation may now be a major objective of a pretrial
conference, new written guidelines in Illinois should more clearly speak
to settlement conference participation as well as to appropriate conduct
for judges, lawyers, parties, and interested nonparties. In addition, new
guidelines should set forth at least some standards for postsettlement
activities.
This Article begins by examining the history of written pretrial
conference laws governing Illinois circuit courts. 9 It then demonstrates
the unfortunate consequences that result when written laws do not
adequately guide settlement conference conduct and employs two
illustrative federal appellate court decisions.10 The Article concludes by
endorsing a new high court rule that provides more guidance on
arranging, conducting, and effectuating settlement conferences.11  The
authors argue that reforms to Rule 218 will promote the convenient
administration of justice by producing better settlement talks,
agreements, and enforcement. 
12
II. THE HISTORY OF WRITTEN PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
LAWS IN ILLINOIS
Pretrial conferences herein include meetings of attorneys in the
presence of trial judges (often in chambers) that, at times, are attended
by parties or interested nonparties. Pretrial conferences are traditionally
scheduled for at least one of three major purposes: management,
settlement, and trial preparation.
13
7. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a). Since the most recent amendment in 1995, Rule 218 has stated
that at a mandatory initial case management conference, "counsel familiar with the case and
authorized to act shall appear." Id. No mention is made of participation by parties or interested
nonparties. Id.
8. This issue is different, and more troublesome, in nonjury settings where the same judge
who presides at a settlement conference could later act as fact-finder at trial.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part HI.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. Participants in case management conferences can address a broad range of issues,
including the scheduling of future pleadings and motions and the planning of formal discovery.
These conferences may be guided by written laws not specifically labeled as pretrial conference
2004]
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In Illinois, written laws on pretrial conferences historically have
included a statute acknowledging the authority of a trial judge to
conduct a pretrial conference subject to high court guidelines, coupled
with an Illinois Supreme Court Rule supplying some guidelines. 14 The
Illinois General Assembly first spoke of pretrial conferences in 1941
when it added Section 581/2 to the Illinois Civil Practice Act.15  That
section authorized a trial judge, subject to Illinois Supreme Court rules,
to direct the attorneys for the parties in a civil action to appear at a
pretrial conference in order to consider "any matter as may aid in the
disposition of the action." 16 Section 58 was supplemented by Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23A, which set forth general guidelines on pretrial
conferences in the Illinois circuit courts.
17
Rule 23A provided that a trial court may, in its discretion, direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear for a conference to consider (1) the
simplification of the issues, (2) pleading amendments, (3) the possibility
of obtaining admissions of fact or documents that would reduce the
need for proof, (4) limitations on the number of expert witnesses, and
(5) other matters as may aid in disposition. 18 The rule also required trial
judges to establish pretrial calendars on which civil actions could be
placed. 19 Once a pretrial conference was held, Rule 23A provided that
the trial judge "shall make an order which recites the agreements made
by the parties ... and which limits the issues for trial to those not
laws. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (stating that scheduling conference addresses matters such
as settlements and formal discovery, though it is specifically coordinated with the pretrial
conference rule, FRCP 16).
14. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1004 (2002) ("The holding of pretrial conferences shall be in
accordance with rules."); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 (providing substantive guidelines for pretrial
conferences).
15. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 182(a), § 58 1/2 (1941) (repealed 1955). The Illinois
Civil Practice Act of 1933 was silent on the topic of pretrial conferences. See Civil Practice Act,
1933 I11. Laws 784. However, the systematic use of pretrial conferences in Illinois courts appears
to have predated the legislative authorization supplied by Section 58 /2. Pre-Trial Conferences in
Circuit Court, 21 CHI. B. REC. 310 (1940) (announcing that on May 1, 1940, Judge Walter La
Buy, Assignment Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, would conduct a pretrial conference
for law cases before they were added to the trial calendar; at these conferences, "counsel familiar
with the case and who are authorized to act shall appear (with or without their clients, as they see
fit)" to consider various issues relating to the case, including the "possibility of adjustment,
compromise or settlement").
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 182(a), § 58 1/2 (1941) (repealed 1955).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 259.23A (1943) (amended 1955). Rule 23A was based largely
on the original FRCP 16, in place at the time Rule 23A was adopted. Compare ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 259.23A (1943) (amended 1955), with FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 308 U.S. 645, 684 (1938)
(providing the original FRCP 16).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 259.23A (1943) (amended 1955).
19. Id. These motions could be placed on the calendar upon motion of the court or the parties.
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disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel. 20  This order,
when entered, controlled "the subsequent course of the action."
21
The Illinois pretrial conference statute and rule were both revised in
1955. Section 58 / was repealed and replaced by section 58.1. The
new section provided that "the holding of pretrial conferences shall be
in accordance with rules." 22 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules were
subsequently renumbered, with guidelines for pretrial conferences
moved to Supreme Court Rule 22.23 In addition to the renumbering,
two significant changes were made in 1955. First, the new statute
authorized a trial judge to compel attendance by individuals "necessary
to make the conference effective." 24  Relatedly, whereas Rule 23A
spoke expressly only to participation by attorneys, the 1955 rule
provided that when a pretrial conference was held, "counsel familiar
with the case and authorized to act shall appear, with or without the
parties as the court directs." 25  Second, the 1955 rule granted a trial
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.1 (1955) (renumbered in 1982 as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1004). This change made the pretrial procedure statute less restrictive with regard to who
could be asked to participate in pretrial conferences. The original statute authorized courts to
"direct the attorneys for the parties" to appear at pretrial conferences. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 182(a), § 58 1/2 (1941) (repealed 1955).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.22 (1955) (reallocated with minor amendments in 1967 as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lIlA, § 218). The text of Rule 22, entitled "Pretrial Procedure,"
promulgated in 1955 read as follows:
In any civil action, the court may hold a pretrial conference. At the conference
counsel familiar with the case and authorized to act shall appear, with or without the
parties as the court directs, to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) Amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) Any other matters which may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites any action taken by the court and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which
specifies as the issues for trial those not disposed of at the conference. The order
controls the subsequent course of the action unless modified.
The court shall establish a pretrial calendar on which actions shall be placed for
consideration, as above provided, either by the court on its own motion or on motion of
any party. The court shall make and enforce all rules and orders necessary to compel
compliance with this rule, and may apply the remedies provided in Rule 19-12(3).
Id.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. I 1A, § 218 note (Smith-Hurd 1984) (Historical and Practice
Notes).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch, 110, § 101.22 (1955) (reallocated with minor amendments in 1967 as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, § 218)). This language was based on language from Cook County
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judge the authority to impose sanctions for failure to appear or to
participate adequately in a pretrial conference. 26 Available sanctions
included dismissal for want of prosecution and entry of a default
judgment.
27
Although both the statute and the rule were again renumbered, the
substance of the 1955 amendments remained in place until 1995. The
statute was later codified as chapter 110, paragraph 2-1004 of the
Illinois Revised Statutes, while the high court later spoke through
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218.28 During the forty-year period in
which the 1955 amendments provided the pretrial conference
guidelines, there was spirited debate over whether settlement talks were
even appropriate for pretrial conferences. The debate arose largely
because settlement facilitation was not mentioned explicitly in written
law. 29 While pretrial conferences were used by some trial judges to
facilitate settlement, the lack of explicit authorization led other trial
judges to eschew settlement talks at pretrial conferences.
30
In 1995, Rule 218 was amended significantly. 31 While the 1955 rule
left the decisions about pretrial conferences to trial court discretion, the
1995 rule requires that an "initial case management conference" be held
within thirty-five days after the parties were at issue and no later than
Local Court Rule 25/2, which authorized trial courts to compel the attendance of represented
parties at pretrial conferences. Rule 251/2 had been in place since January 1, 1942. See
SULLIVAN'S LAW DIRECTORY 158 (1942) (containing the full text of Rule 25 ).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.22 (1955) (reallocated with minor amendments in 1967 as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 218). The 1955 rule further stated that courts "shall make and
enforce all rules and orders necessary to compel compliance with this rule, and may apply the
remedies provided in Rule 19-12(3)." Id.
27. Id. § 101.9-12(3).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1004 (1983) (reallocated in 1991 as 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-104); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, § 218 (1967) (reallocated in 1991 as ILL. SUP. CT. R.
218).
29. Both the 1943 and the 1955 versions of the pretrial conference rule did allow for
consideration of "any other matter which may aid in the disposition of the action," but neither
explicitly employed the term settlement. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §259.23A (1943) (amended
1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.22 (1955) (reallocated with minor amendments in 1967 as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 218). The extent to which this phrase was read as implied
authorization to consider settlement at pretrial conferences varied greatly.
30. See, e.g., Harry M. Fisher, Pre-trial Conference and Its By-products, 1950 U. ILL. L. F.
206, 212-13 (discussing the debate between judges who advocated settlement talks at pretrial
conferences and those who viewed settlement as strictly a by-product of pretrial conferences); see
also Albert W. Jenner, Jr. & Phillip W. Tone, Pleading, Parties, and Trial Practice, 50 Nw. U. L.
REV. 612, 621-22 (1955) (finding that pretrial conferences in Cook County are often "merely
occasions for bringing parties together to talk settlement under the auspices of the court," with the
practice underutilized downstate).
31. 166 Ill. 2d cvii (1995).
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182 days after the filing of the complaint. 32 The new rule also includes
an expanded list of matters that might be considered. The list includes
all issues in the 1955 rule, together with "the possibility of settlement
and scheduling of a settlement conference." 33  However, the rule
language added in 1955 authorizing a trial judge to compel the
attendance of parties has been eliminated.34 The 1995 rule only calls
for "counsel familiar with the case and authorized to act" to appear at
pretrial conferences. 35 Finally, the rule language authorizing sanctions
has been eliminated.36 Rule 218 has not been amended since 1995.37
32. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.22 (1955)
(reallocated with minor amendments in 1967 as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 218).
33. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a). Though this reference to a separate "settlement conference"
seemed to imply that a settlement conference was distinguishable from the "case management
conferences" contemplated by subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 218, no further written laws speak
to settlement conferences. Thus, it appears that settlement conferences are one form of a case
management conference for which Rule 218 provides the guidelines.
34. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.22 (1955).
35. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 218(a).
36. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.22 (1955).
37. The current generally applicable written civil procedure laws on pretrial conferences are
chapter 735, act 5, section 2-104 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes and Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 218. Rule 218 reads as follows:
a) Initial Case Management Conference. Except as provided by local circuit court
rule, which on petition of the chief judge of the circuit has been approved by the
Supreme Court, the court shall hold a case management conference within 35 days
after the parties are at issue and in no event more than 182 days after the filing of the
complaint. At the conference counsel familiar with the case and authorized to act shall
appear and the following shall be considered:
1) the nature, issues, and complexity of the case;
2) the simplification of the issues;
3) amendments to the pleadings;
4) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
5) limitations on discovery including:
i) the number and duration of depositions which may be taken;
ii) the area of expertise and the number of expert witnesses who may be
called; and
iii) deadlines for the disclosure of witnesses and the completion of
written discovery and depositions;
6) the possibility of settlement and scheduling of a settlement conference;
7) the advisability of alternative dispute resolution;
8) the date on which the case should be ready for trial;
9) the advisability of holding subsequent case management conferences; and
10) any other matters which may aid in the disposition of the action.
b) Subsequent Case Management Conferences. At the initial and any subsequent
case management conference, the court shall set a date for a subsequent management
conference or a trial date.
c) Order. At the case management conference, the court shall make an order which
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While the 1995 amendments to Rule 218 include the first written
acknowledgment of settlement as an appropriate objective for a pretrial
conference, they include no significant guidelines on facilitating or
enforcing settlements. There is no explicit acknowledgment of judicial
power to compel the attendance of parties or interested nonparties, even
where they may possess ultimate settlement authority. The amended
rule contains no guidelines on which a trial judge should preside at a
settlement conference; the rule does not speak to whether fundamental
fairness dictates that someone other than the judge scheduled to preside
at any trial should conduct a settlement conference. Furthermore, there
are no guidelines in the amended rule on what might happen when
postsettlement legal issues arise. The committee comments to the 1995
amendments shed no additional light; they focus largely on the case
management objectives of pretrial conferencing. 38  Thus, fundamental
questions regarding settlement conference activities under Rule 218
were left for case law precedents. Unfortunately, there is remarkably
little Illinois case law. 39 Much of it arises under the 1955 rule and says
little about many important questions, such as who may or must
participate and how settlement agreements should be written and
enforced. 40  The silence of the written laws together with the dearth of
recites any action taken by the court, the agreements made by the parties as to any of
the matters considered, and which specifies as the issues for trial those not disposed of
at the conference. The order controls the subsequent course of the action unless
modified. All dates set for the disclosure of witnesses, including rebuttal witnesses,
and the completion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure that discovery will be
completed not later than 60 days before the date on which the trial court reasonably
anticipates that trial will commence, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. This rule
is to be liberally construed to do substantial justice between and among the parties.
d) Calendar. The court shall establish a pretrial calendar on which actions shall be
placed for consideration, as above provided, either by the court on its own motion or
on the motion of any party.
ILL. S. CT. R. 218.
38. Id. (providing the committee comments).
39. See Fisher, supra note 30, at 210 (noting that there are not many cases on the subject of
pretrial conferences, perhaps because occasions for appellate review are limited); see also 3
CLARK A. NICHOLS, NICHOLS ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE § 55:4 (2002) (stating that Illinois
decisions are of little help in attempting to discern Illinois law on pretrial procedures).
40. The most frequently cited Illinois cases with regard to pretrial conferences arise under the
1955 rule and include American Society of Lubrication Engineers v. Roetheli, 621 N.E.2d 30, 33-
34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993), in which the court stated that "one purpose of the pre-trial
conference is to expedite the prosecution of a case, either by hastening a settlement agreement
between the parties or by clarifying the issues ... so that a trial on the merits can occur more
swiftly"; Schaefer v. Sippel, 374 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978), in which the
court held that there is no requirement that a plaintiff be able to prove a prima facie case at the
time a pretrial conference is held; and General Magnetic Corp. v. Erickson, 220 N.E.2d 633, 634
(I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1966), in which the court held that a pretrial conference is not meant to be a
substitute for a full and complete trial on the merits.
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case law leave Illinois circuit judges without much direction and with
much discretion.
III. THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES OF A SILENT PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE RULE
The absence of written guidelines and case precedents is
troublesome. Elsewhere, the failure of written civil procedure laws to
speak to settlement conferences has not prompted definitive
precedents-leading to confusion, uncertainty, and unfortunate
disparities-as two major federal appellate court cases illustrate.
4 1
Each case involves a written pretrial conference law, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16 ("FRCP 16"), that did not provide expressly for
judicially-compelled participation by represented parties and interested
nonparties at settlement conferences. Both cases arose under the 1983
version of FRCP 16. This 1983 rule, like current Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 218, acknowledged settlement as a possible objective of a
pretrial conference, but did not speak directly to judicial authority to
compel the attendance of represented parties or interested nonparties.
42
The first case, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,
involved a settlement conference where a represented party had not
granted settlement authority to its attorney.43 The opinions in the case
show that where there is an absence of written law, judges can take
quite divergent, but always reasonable, approaches to settlement
facilitation. The second case, In re Novak, involved a settlement
conference where a nonparty insurer withheld settlement authority from
the insured defendant whose defense it was providing. 44 The opinion in
this case illustrates how strained (and strange) interpretations of written
civil procedure laws can arise under unclear written civil procedure
laws.
41. Compare In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (conceding that district courts have
no authority to issue orders directed at represented parties or nonparty insured under FRCP 16),
with G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(holding that FRCP 16 does not limit the authority of federal courts to order litigants represented
by counsel to attend pretrial conferences to discuss settlement). Comparable confusion seemingly
persists in the lower federal courts on questions of a trial court's power to order certain forms of
settlement facilitation, including summary jury trials and nonbinding mediations. See, e.g., In re
At. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143-45 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing federal district court decisions
regarding the power of judges to compel unwilling parties to participate in alternative dispute
resolution).
42. The 1983 version of FRCP 16 authorized compelled participation by "attorneys for the
parties and any unrepresented parties." 97 F.R.D. 165, 201 (1983).
43. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
44. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1398.
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In Heileman, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of judicial authority to compel the attendance of a represented
party at a pretrial settlement conference in the absence of explicit
authorization in the written laws. 45  In the case, a federal magistrate
judge had ordered a Joseph Oat "corporate representative with authority
to settle" to attend a settlement conference. 46 The only representative
from Joseph Oat who appeared was the corporation's attorney.47 The
trial court determined that Joseph Oat had violated the order and
imposed sanctions.48 Joseph Oat argued on appeal that the trial court
lacked the authority to order the attendance of the corporate
representative because the written rule on pretrial conferences at the
time only explicitly permitted the trial court to compel the attendance of
"attorneys for the parties or any unrepresented parties." 49
The Seventh Circuit upheld the contempt order and sanctions.
Writing for the majority, Judge Kanne found that the 1983 version of
FRCP 16 did not "completely describe and limit the power of federal
courts."50  He reasoned that the "mere absence of language in the
federal rules specifically authorizing or describing a particular judicial
procedure should not, and does not, give rise to a negative implication
of prohibition." 5 1  Judge Kanne determined that trial judges possess
certain "inherent authority" deriving from "the very nature and
existence" of their offices.52  He held that such authority could be
employed in settings not specifically addressed by rule or statute, but
requiring action in order to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution.53  Judge Kanne concluded that the trial court had the
45. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The sanctions involved the related fees of opposing counsel in the amount of $5860.01
"pursuant to" FRCP 16(0. Id.
49. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (1983) (amended 1987)).
50. Id. at 651.
51. Id. at 652.
52. Id. at 653.
53. Id. Similar principles appear in some Illinois state court precedents. See, e.g., Sander v.
Dow Chem. Co., 651 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 (Ill. 1995) (concluding that inherent authority,
independent of any statute, allows courts to prevent undue delays in case dispositions and to
control dockets); see also Rearden Family Trust v. Wisenbaker, 65 P.3d 1029, 1044 (Haw. 2003).
The authority to order both the party and the party's representative or attorney to be
present at a settlement conference is neither expressly set forth in [Rule 16 of the
Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure] nor in [Rule 12.1 of the Hawaii Rules of the Circuit
Courts]; however, we believe that such a requirement falls well within the inherent
power of the court to "prevent undue delays and to achieve the orderly disposition of
cases."
[Vol. 35
Guiding Civil Case Settlement Conferences
authority to compel the attendance of a Joseph Oat representative, even
without express written-law authorization and that it had not abused its
discretion in doing so.
54
The dissenting judges in Heileman presented very different views on
inherent judicial authority and on the role of written laws in limiting
judicial conduct. Judge Coffey believed that the federal pretrial
conference rule did not "authorize a trial judge to require a represented
party litigant to attend a pretrial conference" and that the rule mandated
that only an unrepresented party litigant and attorneys may be ordered
to appear. 55 He noted that while trial courts do possess some inherent
authority, this authority has limitations. 56 Judge Coffey argued that if
more expansive powers were to be recognized, they should originate in
Supreme Court rulemaking. 57 Judge Coffey also observed that a "host
of problems" accompany an overly broad view of inherent authority.
58
One such problem was the use of inherent authority "to substitute for
the subpoena power at pretrial conferences," raising a "due process
question," since a subpoena is subject to a motion to quash while an
exercise of inherent authority is not.59 Another problem was that in
employing inherent authority to compel represented parties to talk
settlement, trial judges would undermine the appearance of impartiality
and confuse and dismay litigants with their participation. 60 Finally,
Judge Coffey feared that too broad an inherent authority would invite
judicial abuse.
61
Other dissents raised different, but related, concerns. Judge Manion
opined that inherent authority should not be a "license for federal courts
to do whatever seems necessary to move a case along." 62 Thus, "where
a statute or rule specifically addresses a particular area, it is
inappropriate to invoke inherent power to exceed" what the statute
54. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653-54 (finding that abuse of discretion would have occurred if the
court had ordered Joseph Oat Corp. to agree to a particular form of settlement or to any settlement
at all, and stating that abuse also would have occurred if attendance was "so onerous, so clearly
unproductive, or so expensive" that it might also qualify as an abuse of discretion).
55. Id. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting) (stating that there was limited authority in such areas as
contempt and jurisdiction determination).
57. Id. at 663 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 661 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing that such abuse includes "pressure to forego the
essential right of trial").
62. Id. at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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sets.63 Judge Posner warned of the possibility of encouraging "judicial
high-handedness" 64 and reasoned that the order directed at Joseph Oat
was impermissible because Joseph Oat had made it clear it was not
interested in settlement talks. 65 Judge Ripple found that too broad a
recognition of inherent authority would upset the lawmaking balance
between the legislature and the judiciary, 66 as well as promote
inconsistency by encouraging "the individual district court to march to
its own drummer."
67
The Heileman opinions contained both a broad and a narrow
"inherent authority" doctrine. Another federal appellate court employed
neither doctrine, taking a different approach when asked if a trial judge
could compel the appearance of a nonparty insurer at a settlement
conference. 68 In Novak, an employee of the defendant's insurer, Roger
Novak, possessed the settlement authority, which he delegated to
neither the defendant nor the defendant's attorney. 69 A district judge
ordered Novak to attend a "pretrial conference to facilitate settlement
discussions." 70 Novak declined to attend the conference and the district
judge held him in criminal contempt, fining him $500.71 Novak
appealed, arguing the district judge had no authority to compel his
attendance.72 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that FRCP
16 did not explicitly authorize the district court to order Novak to
appear.73 The court of appeals upheld the order of contempt despite
finding that the trial judge had no inherent, statutory, or rule-based
authority to compel directly Mr. Novak's attendance. 74 The court
suggested alternative means by which settlement conference
participation by those other than "attorneys for the parties or any
63. Id. (Manion, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of inherent power "is to fill gaps left
by statute or rule").
64. Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("Oat had made clear that it was not prepared to settle
the case on any terms that required it to pay money.").
66. Id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 666 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
68. See In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 (11 th Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 1399.
70. Id. at 1398.
71. Id. at 1400.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1406 (concluding that "Rule 16 does not explicitly authorize [courts] to issue orders
directed at represented parties or nonparty insurers").
74. Id. at 1408-09 (refusing to extend Heileman to employees of nonparty insurers). The
contempt order was upheld though authority to order Novak to attend was lacking because Novak
was required to obey a court order until it was vacated. Id. at 1409.
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unrepresented parties," including Novak, could be accomplished.75
First, it opined that a trial court employing inherent authority could
require a represented party who has retained full settlement authority to
produce at a settlement conference an individual, such as Novak, who is
"substantially prepared to discuss settlement options." 76 Second, the
appellate court posited that parties that retain settlement authority may,
in fact, be unrepresented with respect to settlement and therefore within
the ambit of FRCP 16 that speaks expressly to compelled attendance by
"unrepresented parties." 77  The Novak court suggested that when a
nonparty insurer controls the settlement of a claim against an insured
defendant, that nonparty's participation could be coerced by an order
directed at the insured who is an unrepresented party for settlement
purposes because of retained settlement authority. 78 The court reasoned
that when an insured defendant's and its nonparty insurer's interests are
"aligned" (the insurer being contractually obligated to defend and to pay
at least part of any judgment entered against the insured), an order
directing the insured as a party to produce a person with full settlement
authority could effectively "coerce cooperation" from the nonparty
insurer, as an agent of the insured, at settlement talks.
79
By employing a strained analysis of FRCP 16, the Novak court
invited trial judges to compel indirectly the attendance of certain
nonparties at settlement conferences. This approach is troubling with
regard to both defendants who have attorneys and nonparty insurers of
defendants. First, it requires a trial judge to determine whether a party
with an attorney is "unrepresented ' 80 based on the degree of settlement
authority delegated to others, a matter often within privileged attorney-
client communications. Second, it seemingly conditions the ability to
effectuate a nonparty insurer's participation in a settlement conference
on a party's ability to influence the insurer as a result of a court order
that does not reach the insurer directly. This approach may not even be
effective when the party and its insurer have their interests aligned. 81
75. Id. at 1404.
76. Id. at 1407 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.
1989)).
77. Id. at 1407 n.19.
78. Id. at 1408.
79. Id. (assuming settlement authority in the insurer).
80. Id. at 1407 n.19 (holding that an otherwise-represented party who retains full settlement
authority is "an unrepresented party with respect to settlement").
81. See id. at 1408 (noting that this limitation on inherent authority may "impede... a district
court's ability to conduct a fruitful settlement conference," as when a nonparty, not itself subject
to inherent authority directives, is also not able to be coerced by the named parties or their
attorneys).
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When the party and its insurer are in conflict (as when policy coverage
issues arise), the Novak approach seems unavailable to compel the
attendance of those crucial to resolution by settlement.
82
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218 presents to Illinois judges questions
similar to those posed in Heileman and Novak. Like the 1983 version of
FRCP 16 at issue in Heileman and Novak, Rule 218 lists settlement as a
legitimate goal of a pretrial conference. 83 But, at best, Rule 218 is silent
on judicial authority to compel participation by parties (represented or
unrepresented) and nonparties. 84 The Heileman and Novak opinions
demonstrate at least three approaches that Illinois judges might employ.
Yet, all three have significant drawbacks. The broad "inherent
authority" approach from the Heileman majority embodies excessive
judicial discretion, with the distinct likelihood of divergent precedents
and inconsistent applications. The more narrow "inherent authority"
approach in the Heileman dissents forecloses the possibility of
compelling the appearance of a party or nonparty, no matter how crucial
to settlement facilitation. Finally, there is the indirect approach
suggested in Novak, in which an insured defendant has an attorney
without settlement authority. Such a party is deemed to be without an
attorney for settlement purposes, so that the presence of a nonparty
insurer can be obtained indirectly through an order against the aligned
insured defendant. This approach uncomfortably stretches the language
of the pretrial conference rule and depends upon questionable
assumptions about securing information on delegated settlement
authority and about the influence of an insured over an insurer.
A simpler way to resolve the issues raised in Heileman and Novak
would be an amended, written, pretrial conference law (or a distinct
written law exclusively devoted to settlement conferencing). 85 A new
law could include guidelines on judicial power over parties and
nonparties. In 1993, FRCP 16 was amended to recognize expressly the
82. See id. (noting that a limitation on inherent authority exists when a nonparty insurer and an
insured party have "conflicting interests"); see also Barley v. Consol. Rail Corp., 820 A.2d 740,
744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding that an employer was unable to produce his former attorneys
for a deposition even though he was ordered to do so; the better approach would have involved
subpoenaing the attorneys).
83. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 218(a)(6).
84. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218 with 97 F.R.D. 165, 201-02 (1983) (providing FRCP 16, as
amended in 1983, and stating that a court may require that a party or its representative be present
or reasonably available by telephone to consider possible settlement of the dispute). But see
Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 85 (1991) (providing a proposal,
which was not included in the final 1983 amendment to FRCP 16, to allow a trial court judge to
require "insurers" of parties to attend settlement conferences).
85. See, e.g., HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12.1 (prescribing a separate settlement rule).
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judicial power to require a party or its representative to be present, or
reasonably available by telephone, in order to consider possible
settlement. A similar amendment to Rule 218 would reduce confusion
and uncertainty, promote uniformity, and facilitate the convenient
administration of justice during the settlement process. 86 Further, Rule
218 amendments could eliminate the need for difficult inquiries into
inherent authority or reliance on dubious techniques of statutory
construction. Finally, a new law could speak to other troubling
settlement conference practices extending beyond issues of compelled
attendance.
IV. ATTRIBUTES OF A NEW SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE RULE:
A GOOD BEGINNING
Whatever the intent, talent, and stamina of those who might craft a
new written law, their initial work product likely will not be
comprehensive, everlasting, flawless, or facile. However major the
initiative, any new lawmaking will likely mark only the beginning
efforts to establish better guidelines for civil case settlement
conferences and their aftermath. Shortcomings in any new law are
inevitable, as there is much to do, only little experience from elsewhere
to draw upon, a history of written pretrial conference laws (and civil
procedure laws more generally) that are slow to reflect the realities of
civil litigation,87 and, most importantly, the need to integrate any new
pretrial conference law with other written laws that also require
revision. So how should reformers begin? We suggest that they focus
on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218 and deal with issues best handled
within a written pretrial conference rule. And, we urge that they begin
in a few arenas of significant practical import: arenas that have already
posed, or are likely to pose, serious difficulties for Illinois lawyers and
judges due to the absence of written laws and arenas where written laws
have proven helpful in, and can serve as models from, other American
states.
88
86. In other state court rules, as well as in FRCP 16, exercises of inherent powers are guided
by written civil procedure laws. See, e.g., ME. Civ. P.R. 66 (a)(1) (establishing "procedures to
implement the inherent and statutory powers of the court" to punish contempt).
87. Consider the remarks on judicial rulemaking of Professor Judith Resnik: "National
rulemaking... frequently represents codification of practice and reflection of change rather than
the commencement of newly-minted regimes." Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing
Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging,
49 ALA. L. REv. 133, 157 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
88. Not all written laws operative elsewhere are easily transferable. For example, there is less
subject matter jurisdiction authority in the Illinois circuit courts than there is in the federal district
courts (essentially diversity or federal question authority, as well as possible supplemental
2004]
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Rule 218 reformers should eschew changes involving lawyer civil
claim settlement authority. While difficulties have arisen in Illinois that
can be addressed through new written laws, 89 reform efforts seem best
directed at revising the attorney professional conduct standards.
90
Settlement conference issues involving individual judge assignments
along with the boundaries of certain judicial conduct 91 also seem better
situated in written laws outside Rule 218, including court system
management (or judicial administration) laws92 and judicial conduct
laws.
93
By contrast, several problem areas now seem ripe for Rule 218
reform. They deal with practical matters and engender confusion that
would likely dissipate with a newly written law. These arenas include
those whose attendance at or participation in pretrial settlement
conferences might be compelled or encouraged, the requisite procedures
for completing contracts once agreements have been reached at pretrial
settlement conferences, and the opportunities for same case enforcement
of agreements reached at pretrial settlement conferences.
A. Compelled Attendance
Rule 218 would better promote the "convenient administration of
justice" if it expressly authorized trial courts to compel the attendance at
settlement conferences of all individuals whose input might be
authority). Thus, many federal judicial concerns about exercising civil case settlement
enforcement jurisdiction do not apply in Illinois. On such federal concerns, see Jeffrey A.
Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing Settlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REV.
33, 56 (2003) (noting case settlement enforcement troubles in federal district courts "including
whether there is judicial discretion to refuse requests that future enforcement jurisdiction be
retained," as may be appropriate when the federal judges find the underlying agreements are
unfair, as well as "whether certain settlement disputes can prompt discretionary refusals of
available enforcement jurisdiction," as should often occur when novel or complex issues of state
substantive law arise).
89. Suggestions addressing these difficulties appear in Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W.
Bartlett, The Authority of Illinois Lawyers To Settle Their Clients' Civil Claims: On Principles
Not Quite Settled, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 199 (2000).
90. These standards appear in article VII of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, with
rule 1.2(a) addressing, rather poorly, lawyer civil claim settlement authority. See ILL. SUP. CT.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
91. Compare Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That? The Need for a Clearer Judicial
Role in Settlement, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 45, 88 (1994) (urging that issues of judicial conduct during
settlement talks be addressed in FRCP 16), with N.D. OKLA. Civ. R. 16.2(c) (mandating that a
judge assigned to a case normally shall not preside over a settlement conference).
92. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 21(b) ("General Orders. The chief judge of each circuit may
enter general orders in the exercise of his general administrative authority, including orders
providing for assignment of judges, general or specialized division, and times and places of
holding court.").
93. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 61-76 (comprising the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct).
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necessary for productive negotiations, including parties and nonparties
(which should include insurers and lienholders). Rule 218 now
explicitly authorizes trial courts to compel the attendance of counsel
only.94 As demonstrated in Heileman and Novak, such a rule may be
read to exclude other interested persons and entities. Yet, because
meaningful settlement discussions, at times, can be held only with
parties, nonparty insurers, and lienholders present, some circuit courts
have taken "self help" measures. This likely has led to inconsistent
settlement conference procedures throughout Illinois. A review of some
local circuit court rules, as well as a recent survey of Illinois circuit
judges, illustrates the use of inconsistent procedures.
At times, trial courts can address problems associated with
inadequate written general civil procedure laws through local court
rules. 95 In Illinois, under Supreme Court Rule 21, local rules must be
consistent with both high court rules and statutes and be "so far as
practicable... uniform throughout" Illinois.96  Many Illinois circuit
courts have spoken on compelled settlement conference participation in
their local rules. Three circuit courts have promulgated local rules that
substantially expand the range of those who may be compelled to
appear, explicitly allowing, such as in the 17th Circuit, that "parties or
their representatives having final settlement authority shall be present or
available by telephone at the time of the pretrial conference." 97 Other
circuit courts have local rules that expressly provide for compelled
attendance at settlement conferences by the parties in marriage
dissolution cases. 98 More than half of the circuits have no local rules on
judicial authority to compel participation at settlement conferences.
99
94. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a) (declaring that "counsel familiar with the case and authorized to
act shall appear").
95. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 21(a) (explaining that "[a] majority of the Appellate Court judges in each
district and a majority of the circuit judges in each circuit" may adopt rules governing cases that
are consistent with state rules).
96. Id. Occasionally, circuit court rulemaking on individual subjects is specifically
recognized, though the general rulemaking guidelines may still apply. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R.
218(a).
Except as provided by local circuit court rule, which on petition of the chief judge of
the circuit has been approved by the Supreme Court, the court shall hold a case
management conference within 35 days after the parties are at issue and in no event
more than 182 days following the filing of the complaint.
Id.
97. ILL. 17TH CIR. CT. R. 11.02(c). The three circuits are the 9th, 14th, and 17th. See ILL.
9TH CIR. CT. R. G-17; ILL. 14TH CIR. CT. R. 6.1; ILL. 17TH CIR. CT. R. 11.02(c).
98. See, e.g., ILL. 16TH CIR. CT. R. 15.17(d); ILL. 18TH CIR. CT. R. 15.09(c); ILL. 19TH CIR.
CT. R. 11.06, 11.07; see also ILL. 10TH CIR. CT. R. app. 1 (2002).
99. See generally 3 ILLINOIS COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE, RULES OF THE CIRCUIT
COURTS (2002) (collecting the rules of the twenty-one Illinois circuit courts).
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Finally, one circuit court rule requires that at a pretrial conference, the
attorney for each party "have present in person or immediately available
by telephone a representative with authority to discuss and determine
each aspect of potential settlement."'
100
While local rules can provide customized solutions for challenges
facing particular trial courts, they also can foster inconsistencies and
may violate the uniformity requirement of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
21.101 The divergent approaches to compelled attendance at Illinois
circuit court settlement conferences are illustrated further in the results
of interviews with six Illinois circuit court judges about settlement
conference practices. 10 2 When the judges were asked whether they ever
compelled the attendance at a settlement conference of "someone on
behalf of the insurance carrier," five out of the six judges answered
yes. 10 3 The other judge indicated that he may request the attendance of
representatives of insurance carriers. 10 4 At least two of the judges who
answered that they compelled attendance by someone on behalf of the
insurance carrier work in circuits where local court rules do not
authorize expressly the compelled attendance of nonparties. 1
0 5
The different local court rules and the survey results suggest that
party and nonparty attendance at settlement conferences likely is
approached differently in the Illinois circuit courts. Some circuit judges
100. ILL. 19TH CIR. CT. R. 4.01(a). This rule is distinguishable from the local court rules in
force in the 9th, 14th, and 17th circuits in that its language appears to directly compel attendance
only of the attorneys for the parties (as consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218), while
compelling participation by parties and nonparties through those attorneys. This rule appears to
mirror the approach taken by the Novak court, which suggested that the participation of nonparty
insurers could be compelled through an order directed at the insured. In re Novak, 932 F.2d
1397, 1408 (11 th Cir. 1991).
101. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that while circuit courts have "inherent power to
enact rules governing the practice and procedure of the business conducted before them," such
rules may not "change substantive law or impose additional substantive burdens upon litigants."
People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ill. 1988) (citing Kinsley v. Kinsley, 57
N.E.2d 449, 450 (Il. 1944)). Local compelled-attendance rules for pretrial conferences arguably
impose new responsibilities for parties and nonparties, but not additional burdens (in areas where
the supreme court does not exercise "sole" rulemaking authority, analyses of "burdens" should
differ from settings like Brazen where the regulation and discipline of lawyers implicates
exclusive rulemaking authority). Id.
102. See Mark S. Mathewson, Illinois Judges Speak Out on Settlement Conferences, 90 ILL.
B.J. 604 (2002).
103. Id. at 605.
104. Id.
105. Id. Judge Hollis Webster of DuPage County and Judge Richard Elrod of Cook County
both answered that they did compel the attendance at settlement conferences of individuals "on
behalf of insurance carriers." Id. However, neither circuit court has a local rule that speaks to
authority to compel attendance by nonparties.
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seemingly compel participation by parties and their representatives in
all types of civil actions based upon local court rules. Other circuit
judges more likely compel participation of parties in discrete types of
cases, such as divorce, specifically addressed in local rules. Yet other
circuit judges usually may not compel participation by anyone other
than attorneys, as expressly provided in Rule 218, though they may
request the appearance of parties or nonparties at settlement conferences
if their participation is desired. 10 6 Other judges may effectuate party
and nonparty participation in settlement talks through orders directed at
attorneys, an approach suggested in Novak. Yet other circuit judges
may compel attendance by parties and nonparties at settlement
conferences through inherent authority orders comparable to those
permitted in Heileman and Novak.
While we acknowledge that settlement conferences should always be
subject to some judicial discretion, we posit that the question of who
can be compelled (or invited) to attend settlement conferences is
sufficiently fundamental to warrant greater uniformity. A new
settlement conference rule that would promote uniformity while
recognizing sufficient judicial discretion to facilitate the "convenient
administration of justice" could be based on a current Michigan high
court rule. The Michigan rule provides that "[i]f the court anticipates
meaningful discussion of settlement, the court may direct that the
parties to the action, agents of parties, representatives of lienholders,
representatives of insurance carriers, or other persons ... be present at
the conference or be immediately available at the time of the
conference." 10 7 Under this rule, for example, a court may compel a
party who has not delegated to an attorney settlement authority (as the
representative of Joseph Oat failed to do in Heileman)10 8 to attend a
pretrial conference without resorting to troubling questions about
inherent authority. Similarly, a court could compel a nonparty insurer
who controls settlement for a defendant (such as the claims agent in
106. Such requests (or invitations) are occasionally expressly recognized in written pretrial
conference laws. See, e.g., VT. R. Civ. P. 16.3(c)(5) (providing that at a "scheduled alternative
dispute resolution session," with the agreement of the parties and the neutral nonparties,
interested nonparties "may be invited to attend").
107. MICH. CT. R. 2.401(F). An order to attend or be available is addressed as well in
Michigan Court Rule 2.506(A)(2), which allows a subpoena to be issued to a party or to a
representative of an insurance carrier for a party for attendance or proximity to "trial." Cf ME. R.
Civ. P. 16B(f)(l)(iv) (stating that alternative dispute resolution conference attendees include
insurance adjusters and that nonparties, as lienholders, "may be requested to attend").
108. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (noting that in Heileman, an attorney
rather than a corporation representative with authority to settle attended a settlement conference).
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Novak) 109 to attend without resorting to a strained interpretation of a
written law. In addition, a nonparty lienholder or subrogee whose
interest likely will be addressed in any settlement could also be ordered
to attend.110 The adoption in Illinois of the Michigan approach should
eliminate the differing (and non-uniform under Rule 21) local court
rules and practices. 
111
B. Procedures for Valid Civil Case Settlement Agreements
Rule 218 also could promote the "convenient administration of
justice" (as well as desirable and perhaps necessary uniformity) by
expressly articulating the procedural requisites for valid settlement
agreements in pretrial conference settings. Currently, Illinois
precedents indicate that Illinois contract law principles usually govern
civil case settlement agreements, 112 whether or not an agreement arose
from a private negotiation between the parties or from a settlement
conference overseen by a judge."13  As a result, for communications
between parties or their representatives to constitute enforceable
contracts at Rule 218 settlement conferences, there must be agreement
on all material terms11 4 as well as compliance with any statutes of
fraud.
1 15
While we do not dispute the application of basic contract law
principles to civil case settlement agreements arising at pretrial
conferences, we do think that such agreements, at times, should warrant
different procedures than agreements reached at wholly private
109. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the facts in Novak).
110. A good example of a bad outcome resulting from the fact that a nonparty lienholder was
not invited to a pretrial settlement conference appears in Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.
Mass. 1999), critically reviewed in Parness & Walker, supra note 3, at 367-69.
111. Maine recently amended its rule of civil procedure to allow settlement conference
attendance orders to be directed to "parties, their insurers and their authorized representatives."
See ME. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The accompanying 2001 Advisory Committee's Notes say: "Although
many judges believe that the court now has the inherent power to compel such attendance, the
grant of express authority dispels any possible argument that under the present rule the court may
not have the power to compel the attendance of an insurer who is not a party." Id.
112. See, e.g., Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying
Illinois contract law to determine whether an attorney had authority to settle a client's claims);
Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Labs., Inc., 972 F.2d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois
contract law to an issue of whether a meeting of the minds occurred as to a settlement agreement).
113. Laserage Tech. Corp., 972 F.2d at 802.
114. Id. (noting that Illinois contract law requires an objective meeting of the minds between
the parties as to all material terms).
115. Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying Illinois
law). In his majority opinion, Judge Posner noted that enforcement of oral settlement agreements
was the general rule and not something unique to Illinois, though Judge Posner also noted that the
general rule has been changed by statute or court rule in some states. Id.
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meetings. After settlement talks occur, disagreements can arise later as
to whether, and under what terms, the parties agreed. 1 6  When such
disputes do arise, there should be differences in the procedures for
judicial assessments of any alleged agreements reached at settlement
conference meetings and at wholly private meetings. In conference
settings, factual determinations often will be based on the recollections
of judges," i7 perhaps without much real chance for the presentation of
other evidence.
118
The confusion that can arise when written civil procedure laws fail to
guide oral agreements allegedly made at settlement conferences is
illustrated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case of Lynch, Inc.
v. SamataMason Inc.,119 a decision, as demonstrated in the next section,
that reflects the approach taken by the Illinois Supreme Court. In
Lynch, a settlement was allegedly reached during a pretrial conference
in a copyright infringement suit commenced in an Illinois federal
court. 120  The parties and their lawyers appeared before a magistrate
judge to talk settlement.1 21 No court reporter was present, and there
was no transcript. 122 According to the magistrate judge's recollection,
the parties "reached an agreement in principle to resolve the litigation"
by a written settlement agreement. 123 After the conference, the parties
exchanged drafts of the agreement. 124 A few months later, the parties
appeared before the judge at a second conference.1 25 Again, there was
no court reporter and no transcript. 126 According to the judge's
116. See, e.g., Higbee, 253 F.3d at 997-1000 (discussing a dispute between parties on whether
and under what terms a settlement was reached at a conference presided over by a trial judge).
117. See, e.g., Brewer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (Ill. 1995);
Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489; cf Higbee, 253 F.3d at 997 (involving a judge who made written
conclusions of law based on a hearing that included testimony to determine whether settlement
had occurred).
118. See Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1333.
Within nine days of the dismissal order, defendant moved to enforce its version of the
settlement agreement .... At the hearing... plaintiffs attorney first contended that
the issue of plaintiffs resignation was never discussed at the settlement conference.
However, the trial judge remembered and found that the issue was discussed and was
the basis of defendant's payment to plaintiff.
Id.
119. Lynch, 279 F.3d at489.
120. Id.
121. Id. (pointing out that the magistrate judge was the one "whom the parties had consented
to have preside over the case").
122. Id.
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recollection of the second conference, the parties said that one issue
regarding a section of the settlement agreement "remained
unresolved." 127 It was agreed that in the event the parties could not
thereafter agree on wording for the section, the parties would submit
competing versions to the judge, who would determine whether the
issue had been settled orally at the second conference, and, if so, "which
version accurately reflects the agreement reached." 128 The parties later
submitted competing versions, and the judge ruled that the defendant's
version was "the one that accurately reflected the agreement that the
parties informed him" at the second conference that "they had
reached." 129 The judge then directed the parties to execute that
version. 130 The plaintiff refused, "whereupon the judge ordered the
litigation dismissed with prejudice," but retained enforcement
jurisdiction. 131 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that it was not bound by
the magistrate judge's recollection of the terms of the oral agreement. 
132
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, effectively finding under Illinois
contract law that the plaintiff could be bound by the judge's
recollection. 133 For the court, Judge Posner said that an oral agreement
at a settlement conference could be "enforceable" and "a proper
predicate for dismissals with prejudice."1 34 However, he then opined
that reliance on the trial judge's memory is a problematic way to
establish the settlement terms because "memory is fallible" and "trial
judges have a natural desire to see cases settled and off their docket,"
which may shape their recollections of settlement conferences. 135 He
suggested that at the end of the second settlement conference, the
magistrate judge "should have called in a court reporter, dictated the
terms of the settlement as he understood them, and made sure that the
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Presumably, this was through an oral agreement at the second conference that was to
be placed in a written agreement following the second conference, as the Seventh Circuit looked
to the magistrate judge's recollection of events at the second conference. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 489.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 490-92.
134. Id. at 490. It would not be enforceable, for example, if there was a statute of frauds
problem. Id.
135. Id. One example of shaped judicial recollection may be found in Higbee v. Sentry Ins.
Co., 253 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2001), in which the court, in deciding a case where the trial
judge, facing what "seem[ed] to be a bit of a difficult plaintiff," enforced an oral agreement
allegedly made in the judge's presence, held the agreement unenforceable because there was no
agreement on all material terms.
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parties agreed." 136 Judge Posner declared that this would have provided
a "solid, indeed an unimpeachable, basis" for finding a settlement,
137
characterizing this technique as "standard practice" that "should be
followed in all cases."
' 138
The appellate court expressly declined to remand for an evidentiary
hearing where the parties might testify as to their recollections, noting
that two years had passed, and the terms of the agreement were
"complex" so that the result of a hearing would be unreliable. 139 And,
it declined to lay down a flat rule that a settlement arising at a pretrial
conference is "void" if a dispute over it "cannot be resolved on the basis
of a written record." 140  Judge Posner reasoned that when the parties
failed to request that the culmination of settlement talks be placed on
the record or in writing, they "assumed the risk" that the judge would
recollect the conclusion differently than they did, and they must "live
with the consequences."'
14 1
In Lynch, the failure of the trial judge to record the settlement in
some way led to conflict, additional litigation that spanned over two
years, and a resolution based upon a trial judge's recollection of
settlement talks that had occurred two weeks earlier. 142 Litigants who
participate in settlement conferences should not be responsible for
ensuring that adequate procedural techniques are used to record
agreements. Nor should litigants who participate in settlement
conferences with judges who do not use "standard" practices be
deemed to have "assumed the risk" of faulty judicial recollections.
136. Lynch, 229 F.3d at 490.
137. Id. at 490-91. Even here, however, there can be problems, such as when a trial judge's
recitation of an alleged oral agreement "in open court" contained inconsistent language and each
side "heard only what it wanted to hear." Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414,
420 (6th Cir. 2000) (permitting no enforcement since no settlement was reached).
138. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 491.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Seventh Circuit found support in a Second Circuit decision, Monaghan v. SZS 33
Assocs., 73 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (2d Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Second
Circuit, stating "that if neither party asks that any part of the discussion be recorded, the judge's
failure to insist that a settlement reached in such a discussion be recorded does not invalidate the
settlement." Lynch, 279 F.3d at 491. Yet, in Monaghan, while the oral agreement was not made
the subject of "a contemporaneous record," there was "substantial compliance" with a state
statutory requirement on recording. Monaghan, 73 F.3d at 1283. The compliance occurred
through a recognized oral agreement in "open court," as later trial court oral decisions, which had
been transcribed, provided the details of the earlier oral agreement and no objections were raised
to judicial recollections (though there were objections to enforcement founded on the argument
that the oral pact did not resolve all material terms of the settlement). Id.
141. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 491.
142. Id. at 489.
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A rule establishing that pretrial conference settlements that "cannot
be resolved on the basis of a written record" are "void" in any same
case enforcement settings would eliminate the need for reliance on
judicial recollections. 143 One such rule operates in Texas, where Civil
Procedure Rule 11 states: "Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no
agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will
be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as
part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of
record." 144 The Texas rule, of course, goes beyond pretrial conference
settlement agreements and touches all agreements during civil
litigation. 145  A more limited rule on "written record" agreements,
which governs only civil case settlement agreements, operates in
Louisiana, where the Louisiana Civil Code says that such an agreement
must either be reduced into writing or recited in open court and
capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding. The
agreement recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from
the record confers upon each of them the right of judicially enforcing
its performance, although its substance may hereafter be written in a
more convenient form. 14
6
These two rules do not ban all oral agreements settling pending civil
cases. They simply ensure that if same case enforcement is sought later,
judicial recollections of settlement talks will not be solicited from the
very judges who will then enforce any agreements they remembered.
As well, any contempt proceedings more typically will involve only
clearly mandated duties.
While there can be significant debate over the wisdom of a rule
requiring that all civil case settlements, including those arranged
privately, be in some form of writing, 147 the need for a more limited
143. Id. at 491; cf Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Div. Sales, Inc., No. 01C4933, 2003 WL
1127905, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2003) (finding that where lawyers and judges are witnesses to
oral contracts sought to be enforced, it is "a factor which is far from insignificant" and that "if the
judge's testimony is required, recusal is likely to be necessary"); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63(C)(1)(a)
(stating that a judicial disqualification is appropriate where the "judge has ... personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding").
144. TEx. R. CIv. PROc. 11.
145. See Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984).
146. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (West 2002).
147. Lynch v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2002). Judge Posner argued
that such a rule would be "inconsistent with the premises of an adversarial system of justice." Id.
at 491. He supported this contention by pointing out that "[n]o one supposes that there is any
impropriety in a judge conducting settlement discussions off the record." Id. Judge Posner
further stated that the Court Reporter's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), specified what proceedings must
be on the record and does not require that settlement conferences be on the record. Id. However,
this reasoning does not appear to address the distinction between putting all settlement
conferences on the record and the separate practice of recording any agreements that are made
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rule to govern in cases like Lynch is more easily justified. Rule 218
should be amended to require the "standard practice," demanding that
trial judges recite settlement conference agreements in the presence of a
court reporter, assuming no written contract. Such an amendment
would reduce postjudgment adversarial conflicts and provide desirable
uniformity. It would facilitate justice between the parties, maintain the
necessary informality of pretrial settlement conferences, and continue to
recognize that oral settlements privately reached between parties may be
enforced in new civil actions.
C. Same Case Enforcement
Whether arising from private talks or settlement conferences,
agreements resolving civil cases in Illinois circuit courts may be
enforced by judges in those very same cases (same case enforcement) or
in new civil cases (later case enforcement). Same case enforcement is
usually available only where there is an express retention of
enforcement jurisdiction or the incorporation of the agreement in a court
order. There should also exist discretionary factors that favor
enforcement. Unfortunately, such guidelines are not well understood in
Illinois, in part because they are not articulated expressly in Rule 218
(or in any other general written civil procedure law). Rule 218
amendments better describing standard enforcement practices are
necessary, as they would promote the "convenient administration of
justice."' 148 Unfortunately, a leading Illinois case, Brewer v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp., provides little help and, in fact, prompts
confusion. 
149
In Brewer, Chester Brewer sued his employer, the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (also known as Amtrak), for injuries suffered
during employment. 150  The trial court held a pretrial settlement
conference attended by the attorneys for both parties as well as by
Amtrak's claims agent. 15 1 Brewer was not in chambers during the
settlement talks. 152  However, he and his wife were then in the
courthouse. 153 At the conference, the attorneys purportedly agreed on a
between the parties at the end of settlement agreements, a practice that Judge Posner stated
"should be followed in all cases." Id.
148. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-104 (2002).
149. Brewer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331 (I11. 1995).
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settlement. 154 The trial judge later dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice
based, in part, on this oral agreement. 155  The agreement called for
Amtrak to pay Brewer $250,000, plus an additional $50,000 in the event
that he underwent surgery within six months of dismissal. 15 6  These
terms were "incorporated" into the dismissal order. 157 The parties later
disagreed, however, on an unincorporated term of the oral agreement
encompassing additional duties for Brewer. 158 Amtrak and its claims
agent alleged that Brewer's attorney had also agreed on Brewer's behalf
at the conference that Brewer would quit his job with Amtrak; however,
Brewer's attorney denied this. 159 No indication that Brewer would quit
his job appeared in the dismissal order. 160  Within nine days of
dismissal, Amtrak moved to enforce its version of the settlement,
16 1
including job termination. Brewer thereafter moved to vacate the
dismissal. 162 The trial judge stated that he remembered that the issue of
Brewer's resignation "was discussed" at the settlement conference and
that Brewer's resignation formed a part of "the basis of defendant's
payment to plaintiff."' 163  The trial judge therefore granted Amtrak's
motion to enforce and ordered Brewer to quit his job. 164 An appellate
court affirmed these decisions. 
165
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Brewer had never
authorized his attorney to agree that he would quit his job. 166 Yet, the
court strongly suggested that had the settlement authority of Brewer's
attorney been established, same case enforcement then would have been
available to Amtrak. For this suggestion, the court cited to two Illinois
154. Id. at 1332-33.
155. See id. This portion of the oral agreement was also later memorialized in a written court
record, encompassing a transcript of an in-court proceeding at which this portion was recited.
156. Id. at 1332.
157, Id. at 1333 ("The trial judge personally spoke to plaintiff prior to dismissing the lawsuit.





162. Id. Brewer sought to vacate under what is now section 5/2-1203 in chapter 735 of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes. Id.
163. Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1333 ("The trial judge did not make any findings of fact or rely on
any evidence.").
164. Id.
165. Brewer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 628 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993),
rev'd, 649 N.E.2d 1331 (Ill. 1995)
166. Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1333. The supreme court's conclusion on this issue has been the
subject of some debate. For an extensive review of Brewer's impact on the issue of attorney-
client relations and the authority of attorneys to settle claims on behalf of their clients in Illinois,
see Parness & Bartlett, supra note 89, at 201-17.
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appellate court precedents, McAllister v. Hayes167 and Sheffield Poly-
Glaz, Inc. v. Humboldt Glass Co. 168 The court stated: "A trial court has
the power to enforce a settlement agreement entered into by the parties
while the suit is pending before the court." 169  The Brewer court
seemingly deemed the suit still pending because Brewer had moved to
vacate the judgment based on the purported settlement within thirty
days of entry of judgment, even though that motion followed the request
by Amtrak for same case enforcement. 170 Brewer was not a "standard
practice" same case enforcement scenario. Standard practice does not
involve a later motion to vacate a judgment. Additionally, enforcement
often occurs more than a month after a judgment is entered. Moreover,
the party wanting jurisdiction to be exercised usually wants the alleged
settlement enforced. What should be the "standard practice" for same
case enforcement? Is it appropriate for inclusion in an amended Rule
218? And, are McAllister and Sheffield, if not Brewer, instructive?
In McAllister, an appellate court relied on Sheffield for the
proposition that "[a] trial court has the power, under certain
circumstances, to summarily enforce a settlement agreement entered
into by the parties while their suit is pending before it.' 17 1 The relevant
oral agreement, reached privately, had been made more than five
months before the defendant sought same case enforcement and
seemingly before the defendant paid to the plaintiff any of the money
indicated in the agreement. 172  The McAllister proposition on
enforcement was not crucial to the result in the case, however, as the
alleged oral agreement was made on behalf of the plaintiff by her
attorney, whom the appellate court found had no settlement authority.
173
As well, unlike Brewer, the trial court in McAllister had never entered a
167. McAllister v. Hayes, 519 N.E.2d 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 3rd Dist. 1988).
168. Sheffield Poly-Glaz, Inc. v. Humboldt Glass Co., 356 N.E.2d 837 (II1. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1976).
169. Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1333. Only Sheffield was cited by the appellate court in Brewer.
Brewer, 628 N.E.2d at 334. The appellate court, however, cited two other Illinois cases:
Brigando v. Republic Steel Corp., 536 N.E.2d 778 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989), and Hopkins v.
Holt, 551 N.E.2d 400 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) (citing Brigando with approval). Brewer, 628
N.E.2d at 334. The Brigando holding that trial courts generally lack same case judicial
enforcement powers for earlier settlements was deemed inapplicable in both Brewer decisions
because Chester Brewer's postjudgment motion to vacate was deemed to open the door to
enforcement jurisdiction, since the vacating and enforcing requests involved the same oral
agreement. Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1333; Brewer, 628 N.E.2d at 334-35.
170. Brewer, 649 N.E.2d at 1333 ("Plaintiff's timely section 2-1203 motion properly brought
before the trial court the issue of the settlement agreement's validity.").
171. McAllister, 519 N.E.2d at 72.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 72-73.
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judgment so that the case always had remained "pending."'174 And,
unlike Brewer, the alleged agreement in McAllister seemingly was not
made during a pretrial settlement conference and in the presence of the
trial judge. 175 Surely, McAllister was not the usual scenario for same
case enforcement.
Nor did the earlier ruling in Sheffield involve "standard practice."
There, an appellate court affirmed a trial judge's enforcement of an oral
agreement. 176 The oral agreement was made in the presence of the trial
judge, with no court reporter present, accompanied by an expectation
that a dismissal order founded on the agreement would be submitted
later by the parties and then entered by the court. 177 Such an order was
never entered, however, because the defendant and its lawyer realized
shortly after reaching the oral agreement that the defendant company's
president "had not understood the terms of the settlement,"1 78 which
caused the defendant to seek to avoid compliance. 179 Sometime later,
upon a hearing, the trial judge granted the plaintiffs motion for the
entry of "judgment in accordance with the oral settlement agreement"'
180
because the judge recalled the same settlement terms as the plaintiff.
181
The appellate court agreed that there was a "binding enforceable
agreement"' 8 2 that could be enforced as the suit was still "pending."'
183
Unlike Brewer, neither McAllister nor Sheffield contained a judgment
where same case enforcement of a purported settlement agreement was
sought. The court in Brewer did not address this difference, though it is
crucial. Judgments end cases at the trial level, though trial courts have
the authority to vacate or modify those judgments under certain
circumstances. However, such authority to vacate or modify should
differ fundamentally from authority to assess settlement pacts and to
undertake their enforcement. Only in judgment alteration settings are
the civil claims that prompted the litigation typically at issue. While
authority to alter judgments usually must be exercised when the
statutory or rule requisites are met, enforcement is far more
174. Id. at 72.
175. Id. at 71.
176. Sheffield Poly-Glaz, Inc. v. Humboldt Glass Co., 356 N.E.2d 837, 871 (I11. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1976).





182. Id. at 841 (rejecting the argument that enforcement was barred due to the president's
misunderstanding).
183. Id. at 841-42.
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discretionary. In cases like Brewer, postjudgment enforcement
jurisdiction would have been better exercised by a trial judge who was
not a witness to key events. Such a new judge could have been secured
through a disqualification of the first judge during the motion to vacate
proceedings in the original suit or, preferably, through a commencement
of a new lawsuit prompted by a discretionary determination not to
exercise any same case enforcement jurisdiction.
More generally (and more often), there is no second lawsuit for
settlement contract breach but rather same case enforcement of an
earlier civil claim settlement in only two settings, neither of which
involves a motion to vacate or modify a judgment prompted by a
settlement. The settings are described in an Illinois appellate case that
was not cited in either Brewer opinion: American Society of Lubrication
Engineers v. Roetheli. In Roetheli, the court stated:
Generally, where the court enters an agreed dismissal order based on a
settlement reached by the parties without the court participating and
the defendant refuses to pay, the plaintiff must file a separate lawsuit
for breach of contract. Here, however, the settlement was reached at a
pre-trial conference with the judge participating, a procedure governed
by Rule 218. Further, the court in the present case, unlike the court in
Brigando and the cases cited in its footnote, retained jurisdiction for
the precise purpose of enforcing the settlement. 
184
This is "standard practice." Similar circumstances prompt possible
same case enforcement jurisdiction in the federal district courts. 185 In
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, the U.S. Supreme
Court sustained such jurisdiction where the settlement terms were
"made part of the order of dismissal," 186 either by express judicial
retention of jurisdiction over the settlement or by incorporation of the
settlement terms in the dismissal order.187  Under Roetheli and
Kokkonen, it would have been better for the Brewer circuit judge to look
to a second suit for enforcement of the job-quitting contract term, as that
term was neither incorporated in the dismissal order nor subject to
jurisdiction retention. Had there been a dispute in Brewer about the
monetary payout, then perhaps to serve judicial efficiency, any
settlement term involving the job, per judicial discretion, should have
184. Am. Soc'y of Lubrication Eng'rs v. Roetheli, 621 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(citations omitted).
185. Parness & Bartlett, supra note 89, at 224. Similar circumstances also underlie same case
enforcement jurisdiction in many American state courts. See, e.g., Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 842 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2003) (holding that there are circumstances in which it is appropriate
for judges to enter enforcement agreements as part of the settlement process).
186. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
187. Id.
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been subject to same case enforcement. Of course, to avoid such issues
of partial same case enforcement, the Brewer trial judge could have
either incorporated all of the settlement terms or none of them (or
retained enforcement jurisdiction over all future contract disputes, or
over none).
A Rule 218 amendment containing the Roetheli principles seems in
order. A change could be modeled after a rule now in place in
California that says
[i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the
parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for
settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may
enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by
the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce
the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the
settlement. 188
Such an amendment would cover both validity and enforcement
issues. It allows parties significant decision making powers regarding
any later disputes. If the parties choose not to provide for same case
enforcement, they could anticipate the potential additional expense (and
delay) associated with second lawsuits, though they also may maintain,
at least for the time being, the secrecy of their agreements. Conversely,
if the parties request same case enforcement, they invite summary
dispute resolutions. A rule amendment should, however, leave trial
judges with some discretion on whether to permit possible same case
enforcement and whether to exercise such jurisdiction when asked.
189
V. CONCLUSION
Written civil procedure laws on pretrial conferences in civil actions in
Illinois trial courts historically have spoken chiefly to trial preparation.
More recently, such laws have recognized explicitly case management
and settlement objectives. Trial preparation and case management
conference procedures are described better in Illinois Supreme Court
Rules and understood better in the legal community. Comparable
guidelines and understanding of settlement conference procedures are
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 2002).
189. A court may choose to decline possible same case enforcement jurisdiction for a number
of reasons, including possible contract illegality and the prospect that an enforcement proceeding
would likely present issues better resolved after there has been an opportunity for a full trial on
the merits before a new judge. A court may further choose to decline to exercise same case
enforcement jurisdiction after an alleged breach for a number of reasons, including the prospect
of significant first impression substantive state-law contract issues arising under the laws of
another state. See, e.g., Parness & Walker, supra note 88, at 52-54 (discussing comparable
discretionary factors for same case enforcement jurisdiction in the federal district courts).
[Vol. 35
2004] Guiding Civil Case Settlement Conferences 809
lacking. Confusion has arisen in several areas of significant practical
import, including judicially compelled and invited participation in
settlement conference talks, procedural requisites for enforceable
agreements arising during such talks, and same and later case
enforcement jurisdiction.
Amendments to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218 addressing
settlement conferencing and its aftermath would promote the more
"convenient administration of justice" in the Illinois circuit courts. In
particular, lawmakers should consider possible changes that speak to
compelled and invited attendance, the procedural requisites necessary
for valid contracts, and same and later case enforcement of settlement
contracts. Fortunately, there are good models available from other
American states. Amendments to Rule 218 should not alter
dramatically current Illinois court practices, but rather would clarify and
unify settlement conference procedures.
